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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002727

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [MOPS](#) [SU](#)

SUBJECT: MINAWI THREATENS TO MOBILIZE AGAINST JANJAWEEED

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: SLM leader and Senior Assistant to the President Minni Minawi has reached an apex of frustration with the Sudanese government's inaction on implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and obvious attempts to foil his efforts to engage non-signatories. Of immediate concern is his reported threat to take action if Janjaweed attacks against villages and other militia attacks against his forces are not stopped. Mid-level Minawi officials have claimed that he has given the government an ultimatum to stop the use of Janjaweed or face Minawi's authorization for his commanders to mobilize their forces against the militia. End Summary.

Minawi's Return Met with Increased Military Operations

¶2. (C) Minawi's attempt to take his message to the people of Darfur between November 6-10 was overshadowed by increased government military operations and the mobilization of Janjaweed militia, which he reportedly believes was orchestrated to counter his efforts to gain momentum for DPA implementation. At the conclusion of his tour, Minawi warned the government that if it did not move to implement portions of the DPA within 60 days, he would quit the government and return to Darfur.

¶3. (C) Minawi has continued to engage DPA non-signatories, and on November 13, his military delegation returned from successful negotiations with commanders of the G-19 and SLM-Unity. The agreement created a unified SLA command of SLM-M, G-19, and SLM-Unity. They pledged to 1) a cessation of hostilities and maintenance of their present positions; 2) allow humanitarian assistance, international NGOs, and commercial convoys safe passage through their areas of control; 3) allow freedom of expression for all parties; 4) work together to achieve unity of effort; 5) refrain from using the agreement for political or media gain; and 6) appoint a chairman to head a committee for implementation of the agreement.

¶4. (C) Minawi informed the government, African Union (AU), and UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) of the agreement and requested the government postpone offensive operations in the area of Birmaza. Government forces attacked Birmaza and participants of the agreement within 24 hours. (Note: There has been no substantive response from AU or UNMIS field headquarters regarding the agreement, and AU representatives in Khartoum are unaware of its existence as of November 22. End note.)

15. (C) With the government's extensive use of Janjaweed elements and other aligned militia against the population over the past week, Minawi has since warned the government that he will authorize his commanders to mobilize against Janjaweed forces and other militias if the government does not restrain them and stop the attacks on the population. He has moved with his senior advisors to Dar el Salaam to convene commanders and discuss their options.

16. (C) He has reportedly threatened to move his heavy artillery out of Abu Gamra to Birmaza to reinforce G-19 and SLM-Unity forces against the Janjaweed. (Note: Minawi's possession of heavy artillery was confirmed by an UNMIS representative in El Fasher, who said that Minawi claims to have taken the equipment from the Sudanese Armed Forces prior to the DPA. End note.) Last week, elements of his forces moved south to reinforce units in Muhajeriya against potential renewed SLM/Free Will attacks. On November 20, local commanders were authorized to counterattack Arab militia that attacked farmers in Haskanita, who had taken up arms against nomads grazing herds in their fields.

Comment

17. (C) Though information is sketchy and has not come directly from Minawi or his senior advisors, the recent lull in fighting in Birmaza and Jebel Marra over the last two days may indicate the government takes his warning seriously. Embassy officers are attempting to reach more senior advisors or Minawi himself to clarify his intent and expected timing

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of decisions. While we do not believe Minawi will move rapidly to fulfill this warning, he will not stand idly for long in the face of continuing Janjaweed attacks against the population of Darfur. Even if he would delay considerably, his commanders may not. End comment.
HUME